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ABSTRACT 
One way to achieve economies of scale and scope, and other potential advantages of firm 
size, is through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Being spectacular business events, and 
very frequent in the eco-system of firms, it has attracted much interest from both researchers 
and practitioners. However, empirical reviews do not support the popularity of M&A. It 
seems that the potential synergies are difficult to realize. A key process and major challenge 
for success, especially for cross-border M&As, is organizational integration. In this work, we 
have studied organizational integration in cross-border M&As primarily through a qualitative 
re-investigation of three case studies with the intent to understand what barriers and enablers 
could explain different outcomes. Through the use of an established coding scheme for 
variables related to synergy realization, and a database containing a number of coded case 
studies, we have also been able to make quantitative comparisons, which contributed to our 
analysis. The outcome is a proposal on how an existing model of synergy realization can be 
refined for cross-border M&As. It includes the addition of state involvement, legal obstacles, 
national culture, integration management and union power as factors influencing 
organizational integration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Firms continuously strive to improve their value-creating activities and their strategic 
position relative to their competitors. The most fundamental goals are to minimize costs and 
to maximize revenues. Firms try to reach these goals through negotiating prices of raw 
materials or components, ensuring efficient production and distribution, developing and 
marketing new products that enhance the benefit for customers. Larger firms may be able to 
reach these goals more effectively and to a higher degree, since larger size enables increased 
bargaining power, economies of scale and scope, learning economies, financial power, and 
market reach. Therefore, growth itself is a valid objective. 
Economies of scale is a reduction in average cost per produced unit over an increasing 
range of output (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley & Schaefer, 2010). Examples of fixed cost are 
general and administrative expenses, property rents and taxes, and costs of production 
equipment.  Scale economies can also be achieved in several areas of a business such as 
advertising, distribution, service networks and research and development (Seth, 1990).  
Economies of scope occur when it is cheaper to produce multiple product lines or services 
in one firm than to produce them in separate firms i.e. savings being achieved as the variety of 
goods or services increases. Economies of scope arise when an production factor that is 
under-utilized for a specific good, for example due to low demand, is jointly utilized for 
production of different goods. Economies of scope may also arise from sharing human capital 
such as specific know-how (Seth, 1990). By exploiting economies of scope firms can achieve 
efficiency in production and reduction of the total cost per unit. Prahalad & Bettis (1986) 
suggest that economies of scope can arise from other sources, such as managers with specific 
skills in finance, R&D, production, etc. that can be spread within the diversified firm. 
Pralahad & Bettis (1986) describes the importance of top managers’ ability to influence the 
strategic choices made by lower-level managers in diversified firms that has impact on firms’ 
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overall performance. “Top management of a (diversified) firm should not be viewed 'as a 
faceless abstraction', but as a 'collection of key individuals' (i.e. a dominant coalition) who 
have significant influence on the way the firm is managed. This collection of individuals, to a 
large extent, influence the style and process of management, and as a result the key resource 
allocation choices” (Pralahad & Bettis, 1986:489).  
Firm size is also connected to market power, which can help firms to keep new entrants 
away and strengthen their position towards existing competitors, i.e. market power can play a 
role of entry barrier and help firms to gain a stronger competitive position (Caves & Porter, 
1977). 
Firm can diversify on their own to seek the advantages described above, but in an 
increasingly competitive environment, organic incremental growth may not be possible to 
achieve at a sufficient rate. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is an alternative way to make 
an instant leap in size and potentially achieve economies of scale and scope. In addition, 
through M&As firms may get better access to raw materials, products, technologies, 
capabilities, markets and customers, potentially rendering them a stronger competitive 
position. 
Indeed, M&A is a frequent phenomenon in the business environment. Although it has been 
observed in waves throughout the 20th century, the frequency of M&As has increased 
dramatically since the 1980’s, with global peaks in 2000 and 2007 (Dikova & Sahib, 2013; 
www.imaa-institute.org). However, for various reasons, M&As are far from always 
successful (Datta, 1991; King, Dalton, Daily & Covin, 2004; Lubatkin, 1983; Porter, 1987), 
and much research has been performed to understand the strategic conditions and 
organizational processes of M&As. One key part of achieving the potential synergies of 
M&As is a successful organizational integration after the deal has been closed (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1987; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). But this may be difficult to achieve due to 
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threats to job security, differing organizational cultures, and loyalties remaining with the 
original organization and projects, rather than those of the new firm. 
The need to improve firm performance is driven by competition. European firms have 
faced considerable competition from US firms since the 1960’s. Large American firms, 
having achieved enormous size and strength in their home markets were a major threat to 
European firms operating in a much more fragmented industry, and whose operations were 
mostly national (Olie, 1996). In order to meet the challenge and competitiveness of US firms, 
there was a need for industry consolidation not only nationally, but also across European 
borders. 
Cross-border acquisitions have become an increasingly common way to achieve foreign 
expansion in recent years (Slangen, 2006). For cross-border M&A there are even more 
potential barriers to effective organizational integration, such as legal, political, managerial 
obstacles (Mazzolini, 1975), fiscal, technical, behavioral (Stewart, 1972) as well as greater 
differences in organizational, managerial and national culture (Larsson & Risberg, 1998; Olie, 
1996; Slangen, 2006).  
The majority of M&A research takes specific perspectives, such as strategic, economic, 
finance, organizational and human resource management (HRM) (Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999). A few researchers have tried to integrate the different perspectives, e.g. Larsson & 
Finkelstein (1999). However, our impression is that few such integrated approaches have been 
used for cross-border M&A. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Being such a frequent business phenomenon in spite of weak empirical outcomes, and 
widely researched without clear conclusions, M&A continues to be a relevant subject with 
remaining possibilities for further research. With organizational integration as a key process 
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for success, and the added dimensions and potential barriers in cross-border M&A, we found 
organizational integration in cross-border M&As as an interesting area of focus for our thesis.  
Among cross-border M&As, there are examples of both successful (e.g. Electrolux-
Zanussi (Andersson, De Sanctis, Finzi, Franzan, Ghoshal & Haspeslagh, 1989)) and 
unsuccessful (e.g. Hoogovens-Hoesch, (Olie, 1996)) outcomes. The varying outcomes 
observed have interested us in investigating closer what barriers to and enablers for 
organizational integration that may be important for understanding cross-border M&As and 
how they relate to the different outcomes. 
Since M&As in general are complex undertakings, we would like to use a framework 
where different research perspectives (strategic, organizational, HRM) are combined in an 
integrated model. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) have proposed such a model, which they 
tested by using a coding of key variables related to synergy realization across a sample of case 
studies. From what we can find, such integrated models have not been used to study cross-
border M&As in particular. Furthermore, through the coding, it is mainly a quantitative model 
that can provide external validity, but it does not attempt to identify specific factors of cross-
border M&As or explain in what ways they affect organizational integration. The purpose of 
this study is to seek a better understanding of cross-border M&As by investigating potential 
barriers and enablers of organizational integration. We will try to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What factors influence organizational integration in cross-border M&As? 
2. How can these factors be included in an integrated model of synergy realization to 
better explain outcomes in cross-border M&As? 
We will try to answer these questions by first reviewing two case studies of cross-border 
M&As in detail, and also code them according the scheme of Larsson & Finkelstein (1999). 
In a second step we will investigate the findings qualitatively against another case study on an 
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M&A with a different outcome, i.e. successful vs. unsuccessful. Finally, through the coding, 
we will make quantitative comparisons between the two case studies and other cross-border 
M&As (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). The ability to explain both successful and unsuccessful 
outcomes will be a test of our contributions to the model. 
THEORY 
Theoretical perspectives on mergers and acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have occurred in waves during the last century, and have 
transformed industries and markets. Within each wave different reasons for mergers were 
viewed. Primary reasons include reduction of competition and achieving economies of scale 
through horizontal and vertical integration, market power gains, geographical expansion, 
efficiency gains, resource sharing, and diversification (Besanko et al., 2010). 
 In practice it seems to be difficult to reach the desired benefits of mergers and acquisitions 
in spite of great variety of literature and research on M&A. Several scholars explain those 
failures by the fragmented nature of M&A studies (e.g. Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).  
In the field of strategic management, M&As were studied as a method of diversification. 
The field of economics studied M&A with accounting-based measures with primary focus on 
economies of scale and market power. Finance scholars used stock market-based measures to 
study acquisition performance where shareholders’ return defines company’s performance. 
Organizational theories focused on the human side of the integration process concentrating 
primarily on culture clash, conflict resolution and acculturation. Finally, HRM literature 
studied M&A through psychological perspective focusing on communication and M&A 
impact on career (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). As a result of this fragmentation we can 
observe conflicting results between different perspectives. 
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More recent studies began to synthesize some theoretical perspectives: strategy and finance 
perspectives and organizational and financial perspective. Nonintegrative nature of M&A 
research occurs due to “strategic, economic, and financial M&A research tends to disregard 
the organizational and HRM issues that are a central part of the acquisition integration process 
and may play a large role in determining the success or failure of M&A” (Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999:2). 
Ibid. (1999) created a model that defines four separately studied M&A main issues: 
combination, integration, employee and performance. By synthesizing and integrating these 
four issues authors studied correlations between these variables (combination potential, 
organizational integration and employee resistance) and synergy realization using the case 
survey method to test this relationship empirically across a broad sample of case studies.  
 Relatedness 
The combination potential of M&As is viewed in terms of their degree of relatedness 
success (Datta, 1991; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Relatedness is proposed as an important 
indicator for M&A. Richard Rumelt (1974, as referenced in Besanko et al., 2010) developed 
the notion of relatedness and showed with his study that related diversification strategies 
outperform unrelated diversification strategies. He classified businesses in four groups based 
on the relatedness of their businesses: a single business firm where more than 95 percent of 
annual revenue comes from firm’s primary activity; a dominant-business firm with annual 
revenue between 70 and 95 percent coming from the primary activity; a related-business firm 
and an unrelated business firm (Besanko et al., 2010).  According to Rumelt, merging firms 
considered to be related when” a common skill, resource, market or purpose applies to each, 
i.e. if they employ similar production techniques, serve similar markets and use similar 
distribution systems, and employ science-based research” (Seth, 1990:100). During his study 
Rumelt found that unrelated diversification strategy is the one of the lowest performing on the 
  9 
 
average. More recent statistical study of diversity and performance by Nathanson and 
Cassano found that on the average returns declined as product diversity increased, while 
returns remained relatively steady as market diversity increased (Pralahad & Bettis, 1986). 
Both studies showed that relatedness is the key aspect linking diversification and firms’ 
performance. But relatedness is only an indicator of the potential synergetic benefits that can 
be realized through effective acquisition process.  
Strategic and organizational fit 
Strategic and organizational fit are viewed as determinants of the acquisition process 
success (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Strategic fit can be defined as “the degree to which the 
target firm augments or complements the parent's strategy and thus makes identifiable 
contributions to the financial and nonfinancial goals of the parent” (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986:146). Studies of strategic fit show a positive relation between strategic fit and value 
creation in acquisitions. Prior research in strategic management focused mainly on strategic 
fit, not only because of its practical requirement, but also because it is easier to extract data 
for strategic analysis. Strategic data can be extracted from sales, market and capital market 
projections (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). While strategic fit is a necessary condition for 
acquisition success, organizational fit is considered to be an important supplement. 
Organizational fit focuses primarily on integration impact on day-to-day operations after 
acquisition. Datta (1991) indicates management style to be a particularly important factor of 
organizational fit. Management styles differ across firms: some managers can be more risk 
averse than others, some managers rely on common sense and gut feelings where the others 
rely exclusively on financial and economic rapports and analysis. Management styles can also 
differ in levels of flexibility, control, communication and tolerance for change. Datta (1991) 
found in his study that difference in management style and thinking contributes to post-
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acquisition problems and results in conflicts, difficulties in achieving synergies, reduction of 
market share and poor overall performance. 
Synergy 
As discussed earlier, M&As were studied through different perspectives. The issue with 
the fragmented studies is the difficulty of measuring merger and acquisition performance. 
Studies that are taking in to account accounting-based (economics) and stock-market-based 
(finance) measures pay little attention to organizational integration that can be a crucial factor 
of M&A performance. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) view M&A performance instead, in 
terms of synergy realization, defining it as the actual net benefits (reduced cost per unit, 
increased income, etc.) created by the interaction of two firms involved in a merger or 
acquisition in relation with the combination's potential, the degree of integration achieved, 
and the lack of employee resistance. 
Synergy is reached when a combination of two companies gives higher performance and 
greater value creation than if the firms operate as two separate parts. The potential benefit 
achieved through the combination is the primarily drive force behind the M&A. Synergy is 
the term that is commonly used in M&A studies and is a central concept in M&A literature.  
DePamphilis (2010) names the two basic types of synergy: operating synergy and financial 
synergy. Operating synergy is reached through the economies of scale and economies of 
scope, and is measured as reduction in production and marketing cost per unit. Financial 
synergy is reached through lower cost of capital and risk reduction. By achieving financial 
synergy company aim to improve their financial performance and gain more wealth for their 
shareholders. 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) name two additional types of synergy: market power synergy 
and management synergy. Market power synergy is also known as collusive synergy and 
achieved through higher market and purchasing power. Increased bargaining power through 
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bigger size and market concentration gives the firm a possibility to obtain higher customer 
prices reflecting in higher revenue and lower supplier prices reflecting in cost reduction. 
Management synergy is achieved through applying competencies across acquired firms and 
knowhow sharing. 
Organizational integration 
Some researchers argued that combination potential is difficult to realize without proper 
coordination and integration (Datta, 1991). Organizational integration plays an important role 
in synergy realization and has a direct effect on M&A performance. Without it, a company 
can fail to reach expected synergy and benefits from M&A in spite of presence of earlier 
discussed important factors. Larsson, Brousseau, Driver,  & Sweet (2004) states that the 
secret of successful M&A lies in choosing the right approach to organizational integration. 
Ibid. (2004) define three commonly used and discussed organizational integration types: 
soft/avoiding, hard / controlling and co-competence. With soft or avoiding integration 
approach existing value of the joining firms are taken into account. Integration is slow and 
careful. With soft approach companies try to learn about each other under ongoing process of 
integration and establish trust. An advantage with this approach is that employee resistance is 
minimized.  A disadvantage is that integration is “put on hold” and expected operational 
synergy is lost or achieved too slow. 
 Another integration approach is hard or controlling. This approach is the opposite of the 
previously described soft /avoiding approach. This approach can be described as forceful and 
one-side implementation of the acquirer´s way of doing business as the only right one. 
Integration precedes fast and usually meets a lot of resistance from the acquired firm and 
employees. These two approaches contributed to emerging of so called M&A integration 
dilemma. Choose soft approach at the expense of functional integration or hard approach and 
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reach functional integration but at the great cost of employee resistance? No matter what one 
chooses there is a pitfall that comes with the approach.  
Larsson et al. (2004) names the third approach to be an answer to that dilemma, the co-
competence integration approach. This approach appeared to give firms opportunity to reach 
functional synergy and be able to avoid employee resistance. The approach focuses on 
exploiting and combining firms` unique and valuable competences and can be seen as a 
mixture of the two previously described approaches. Co-competence organizational 
integration builds on positive and motivational approach with two-way communication, 
career development and organizational investments. At the same time integration can proceed 
with high pace to reach synergy realization. 
Employee resistance 
Practice shows that in spite of positive combination effects and high degree of 
organizational integration there is evidence of unsuccessful M&A implementation where 
expected benefits are not reached. Some researchers argue that employee’s reactions to 
merger are the reasons of M&A failure. Employee resistance is an important factor to M&A 
success and studied in great variety. Employee resistance can take a number of forms: 
“persistent reduction in output, increase in the number of "quits" and requests for transfer, 
chronic quarrels, sullen hostility, wildcat or slowdown strikes, and, of course, the expression 
of a lot of pseudo logical reasons why the change will not work” (Lawrence, 1969). We can 
summarize the main reasons identified in the literature on employee resistance. They can be 
grouped by three reasons: individual, culture and career. Employee reaction to M&A can be 
negative due to (1) individual psychological perspective as distrust, fear of change, personal 
attitudes, (2) culture clashes, and (3) change in career plans as layoffs, relocation, and loss of 
influence (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). 
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Employee resistance was primarily studied in terms of cultural differences and 
acculturation. Culture is defined as “the beliefs and assumptions shared by members of an 
organization” (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988:80). Organizational culture has been used to 
explain differences in managerial styles and the success of some organizations. By managing 
the culture in the right way, companies can be more successful. Problems appear when 
companies with different cultures decide to merge or one company acquires another.  This 
lead to culture clashes that result in misunderstanding, stress, conflicts, negative effects on 
quality and reduced employee performance. Acculturation helps to resolve issues associated 
with cultural clashes.  
Acculturation 
Acculturation can be defined as “the modification of the culture of a group or individual as 
a result of contact with a different culture” (thefreedictionary.com, 2013). Some researchers 
suggest that fit between cultures in the acquirer and the acquired firm plays an essential role 
in the success of the merger implementation as less employee resistance observed with more 
similar cultures. 
Cross-border mergers make the case even more challenging as companies can differ 
greatly with their organizational and national cultures leading to higher degree of employee 
resistant. That’s why acculturation process should take a central role in cross-border mergers 
as it implies higher consequences for merger implementation success. Larsson & Lubatikin 
(2001) show with their study that there are ways to overcome cultural barriers through 
involving employees in socialization activities such as introduction programs, training, cross 
visits, celebrations and other social activities. If autonomy of the acquired firm is restricted 
then additional control mechanisms are advised: transition teams, senior management 
involvement and temporary personnel exchange/ rotation. 
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The role of the integration manager 
The integration manager is a person dedicated in one of the two merging organizations to 
make the integration happen. Teerikangas, Véry & Pisano (2011) have studied the role of 
integration managers in the acquisition process and found that they have an impact on 
acquisition performance defined as value captured. Their findings contribute to explaining 
how to manage the acquisition process most effectively by utilizing the integration manager. 
According to their study, the integration manager captures value by acting as (a) a change 
agent, (b) a cultural carrier, and (c) a knowledge transferor.  
As a change agent, the integration manager should facilitate and guide the process of 
organizational and operational alignment between the two firms by spurring change, ensuring 
integration progress, showing support and providing a link to top management. In their study, 
authors found evidence that firms who had integration managers were more successful in 
achieving change. 
Cultural change in cross-border mergers not only occurs at the level of organizational 
culture, but also at the level of national culture. Thus, the integration manager also has a 
cultural carrier role in in enabling organizational culture change and supporting adaption 
between the firms’ national cultures. In the role of being a culture translator, the manager 
helps to translate the firms’ national cultures to foreign employees. However, not much 
attention has been given to the integration manager’s cultural carrier role in earlier research 
(Teerikangas et al., 2011). 
National culture dimensions in mergers and acquisitions 
While organizational researchers have given most attention to organizational culture, they 
have failed to acknowledge that organizational culture is affected by national culture (Olie, 
1996). Several studies have attempted to explore the relationship between national culture and 
organizational behavior. 
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Hofstede (1984) has found that national culture plays an important role in management and 
planning. He states that a management technique or philosophy that is appropriate in one 
national culture is not necessarily appropriate in another. Hence, there is a need for 
international managers to take cultural differences between countries into account when 
transferring management ideas from one country to another. In his study he found four 
dimensions along which elements of a national culture could be described: individualism 
versus collectivism, large versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity versus femininity. An index score indicated the position of a 
country on each of the four dimensions where the lowest country scores around zero and the 
highest around 100. It can be concluded from Hofstede’s model (1984) that Germany and The 
Netherlands are culturally different in the dimensions masculinity versus femininity, 
individualism versus collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. Germany has a higher degree of 
collectivism than The Netherlands, which means that Germans are to a larger degree 
motivated by group interests and expect the group to look after them. According to the author, 
Germany is a typical example of a performance society with a masculine culture and The 
Netherlands is a typical example of a welfare society with a feminine culture. Masculinity is 
associated to performance, career and heroic managers whereas femininity stands for welfare, 
relationships and quality of life. Germany has a stronger uncertainty avoidance score than The 
Netherlands. In cultures with high uncertainty avoidance, rules, formalization and 
standardization tend to be rigorous. For example, this dimension affects how meetings are 
conducted. Hofstede (1984) states that differences in the cultural need for formalization and 
standardization may lead to deep misunderstandings and inefficiencies when management 
skills are transferred between countries. 
Given that there are cultural differences between nations, post-merger integration may be 
more difficult in international mergers than in domestic mergers and some countries may be 
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more difficult to combine than others (Olie, 1996). In addition to Hofstede's dimensions, there 
have been other attempts to cluster countries based on their culture. As a result, Western 
countries can be divided into four clusters where The Netherlands belongs to the Nordic 
cluster and Germany belongs to the Germanic cluster. Olie (1996) anticipates that mergers 
between organizations from countries in different clusters have more culture-related 
integration problems. Several researchers have studied the effect of national cultural distance 
on acquisition performance and the results have shown both positive and negative 
relationships (Dikova & Sahib, 2013; Slangen, 2006). The group of studies who found a 
negative relation between cultural distance and acquisition performance suggest that it is due 
to increased cost of integration and cultural collision during the post-acquisition process. A 
positive relationship could, on the other hand, be explained by the fact that cultural 
differences provide the acquirer with a new set of routines to operate successfully in a new 
environment (Dikova & Sahib, 2013). The studies by Dikova & Sahib (2013) and Slangen 
(2006) have attempted to reconcile these research streams.  
Slangen (2006) studied the effect of national cultural distance on acquisition performance 
in 102 Dutch cross-border acquisitions in 30 countries. The study showed that effect of 
national cultural distance on cross-border acquisition performance is neither positive nor 
negative, but dependent on the level of post-acquisition integration. Cultural differences are 
only negative if the planned level of post-acquisition integration is high, but if the acquired 
unit operates with autonomy, cultural differences should not harm its performance. Slangen 
(2006) even argue that national cultural distance can be beneficial if post-acquisition 
integration is limited since the firms gain access to one another’s country-specific practices 
and can selectively adapt them.   
Dikova and Sahib (2013) suggest that the effect of cultural distance on cross-border 
acquisition performance is dependent on the level of acquisition experience of the acquirer. 
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Internationally experienced acquirers are more likely to be aware of cultural differences and 
are therefore better at resolving culture-related conflicts, which leads to a higher acquisition 
performance. On the contrary, performance of cross-border acquisitions by inexperienced 
acquirers is lower because they lack culturally sensitive anti-conflict plans, which affects the 
ability to fully benefit from cultural distances (Dikova & Sahib, 2013). 
European cross-border mergers 
On top of cultural differences, which may be even more difficult to overcome in 
organizational integration between firm from different countries with strong national 
identities, Mazzolini (1975) points to a number of additional obstacles for cross-border 
mergers in Europe. Among external/environmental obstacles is the absence of a legal basis for 
a truly European firm. Although ownership of the combined entity can be shared across 
borders, a company can have its legal registration only in one country. The legal structure 
usually separates the operating companies from holding companies and can take various 
forms such as cross-holding, joint holding or contractual structure (Olie, 1996). An 
organizational structure different from the legal one can be used to enhance coordination and 
integration, but as will be presented in the results section, may not be effective. Further legal 
obstacles related to taxation, control of capital or stock flows, and accounting rules, have a 
more direct and practical effect. Mazzolini (1975) also found that although politicians often 
picture themselves as proponents of European integration and transnational business 
collaboration, their first priority is usually the national interest. This may be due to fear of 
reduced domestic investments, national independence in industries such as military equipment 
or energy, or prestige attached to a firm’s national identity. Subtle influences are exerted 
through subsidy cuts or through financial intermediaries, or in some countries such as France, 
through informal ties between public agents and management. Among internal/managerial 
obstacles, Mazzolini (1975) found that language is an important obstacle. Besides the obvious 
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issue of comprehension, it hinders socialization as a way to integrate the human assets in a 
firm. Also, if one of the two partners has to give up his language in favor of the other, it can 
cause a feeling of disadvantage and cause conscious or subconscious resentment. Nationalism 
among managers can also be an important obstacle. Although not openly displayed, it may 
come from a desire to maintain the firm’s national image, a belief in the superiority of own 
working practices, and leads to inefficient decision-making and reduced effort to adapt and 
integrate. Finally, Mazzolini  (1975) brings up a lack of skills in international business and 
strategic planning among European managers. The former is caused by a national rather than 
European focus throughout the educational system, and limited international experience. The 
latter results in failure to identify the opportunities of cross-border mergers, and firms acting 
only as a response to imminent threats rather than proactively. 
PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We base our preliminary theoretical framework on the integrated model for M&A 
performance by Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) (see Figure 1). In this framework, synergy 
realization is the dependent variable with combination potential, organizational integration 
and employee resistance as direct antecedents. The direct antecedents have been described in 
the Theory section and integrate the perspectives of strategic management, organizational 
research and HRM. Management style similarity, cross-border combinations and relative size 
are independent variables influencing the direct antecedents of synergy realization. Each 
variable in the framework can be measured for a specific M&A via a set of items in a coding 
scheme (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). The focus of this thesis is to investigate the 
relationship between the variables cross-border combinations and organizational integration. 
Our literature review has suggested that barriers and enablers involved in this relationship 
might include legal obstacles (Mazzolini, 1975), integration managers (Teerikangas et al., 
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2011) and national culture (Dikova & Sahib, 2013; Hofstede, 1984). This leads us to our 
preliminary theoretical framework as seen in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 1. Integrated model of M&A performance by Larsson & Finkelstein (1999). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Preliminary theoretical framework of the study. 
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METHOD 
In this section we describe how our research study was conducted. First, we explain the 
choice of research design. This is followed by a description of the different steps in our study 
with regards to sampling, measurements and data analysis. Finally, we discuss the reliability 
and validity of our study. 
Research design 
The purpose of this study can be condensed into three main objectives: (1) to seek a deeper 
understanding of potential barriers and enablers for cross-border M&As, (2) to investigate 
how these findings can be included in an integrated model of synergy realization and (3) to 
test the ability to explain both successful and unsuccessful outcomes of cross-border M&As 
with our findings.  
Since existing theory is fragmented (as mentioned above) and does not provide clear and 
consistent answers to our first objective, an explorative stand was preferable. Therefore, we 
decided that a qualitative approach with an inductive strategy served our needs best in 
reaching the first objective. In inductive research, data are collected to build theory rather than 
to test it (Bryman & Bell, 2011). However, to reach our second objective, we needed to test 
an established framework. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) conducted a study where they built a 
synergy realization model based on 61 cases. This resulted in a database comprising of 
measurements on each case. The use of their framework had the benefit of providing us with 
standardized measurements to compare cases with the database. This would support our all of 
our objectives with a quantitative component. Hence, our third objective would be enabled by 
both a qualitative and a quantitative comparison between successful and unsuccessful cases. 
The combination of exploring relationships in more depth and a quantitative comparison to 
an established database of cases prompted us to take a mixed methods approach to our study. 
Mixed methods research entails a quantitative as well as a qualitative component and has 
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become more common and accepted among researchers in the past years (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). We chose to employ a traditional qualitative method in combination with a mixed 
method called case survey method, which is described below. Due to the complexity and 
nature of the subject and the intent to compare cases, we found that a case study on multiple 
cases was most suitable to answer our research questions. 
Case survey method 
Larsson & Finkelstein’s study (1999) was built on the case survey method. The case 
survey method bridges qualitative and quantitative research and entails four basic steps: (1) 
select a group of existing case studies, (2) design a coding scheme to convert the qualitative 
case descriptions into quantified variables, (3) code the cases using multiple raters and (4) 
analyze the coded data (Larsson, 1993). There are several strengths of using the case survey 
method. For our choice of research design, the key benefit of using the case survey was that it 
combines the ability to study complex phenomena with quantified measures that allows for 
analysis of cross-sectional patterns. Furthermore, the case study method addressed the 
challenge of resource limitations by making use of previous research efforts reported in case 
studies (Larsson, 1993). A potential limitation with the case survey method is the 
simplification of a complex phenomenon through the coding procedure (Larsson, 1993). This 
makes the analysis of a complex phenomenon such as barriers to synergy realization more of 
a difficult task. Therefore, we found a qualitative design with an inductive approach as more 
suitable for the theory generating part of the study 
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Research steps 
After selecting the cases, the qualitative and quantitative components of the study were 
applied in combinations in two major steps.  
Step 0. In the first step we selected the cases for our research. Given time and resource 
constrains, we decided to make use of previous research efforts reported in case studies. This 
would also allow us to deploy the case survey method used in the study by Larsson & 
Finkelstein (1999) and described by Larsson (1993). After expressing an interest in cross-
border mergers, our supervisor Rikard Larsson provided us with the book “European 
transnational mergers” by Olie (1996) and suggested us to make use of the case studies 
within. The book entailed three case studies of which we decided to select two. The discarded 
case study described a complex merger involving three partners, which we assessed would be 
a difficult task to code. In addition, we only had two authors coding which limited the 
resources and time to code three cases. The selected two cases each described a merger 
between a Dutch and a German company in the 1970’s and are detailed in Table 1 below. 
From here on, we will refer to the selected cases as case A and case B.  Case A and B fulfilled 
the selection criteria of the original study by Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) by: (1) describing 
a specific merger or acquisition, (2) containing at least two pages of description on both 
strategic and organizational issues and (3) including a description of at least one year of the 
integrations process. In addition, our cases were also richer in number of pages in comparison 
to the average length of 50 pages in the original study (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999) and 
allowed us to answer our research question. Since case A and B both described unsuccessful 
mergers, we decided to include a third case on a successful cross-border merger to enable 
reflections about contrasting findings in our study. We decided to choose a case from the 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) database: Electrolux-Zanussi. This case will be called case C 
from here on, and is briefly described in Table 1 below. 
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A potential limitation with using case studies as empirical data is that it makes use of 
secondary data, which implies a risk that data was left out and lack of insider understanding 
of the data (Larsson, 1993; Bryman & Bell, 2011). However, we find this solution reasonable 
due to the large investments in time and resources required to study cross-border M&As. We 
compensate for the fact that we use secondary data by studying three cases, which allows for 
interesting comparisons. A secondary analysis also offers the opportunity of making new 
findings in under-explored data (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
Case 
ID 
Merger 
partners 
Reference Number 
of pages 
Country Sector Year 
A Fokker 
 
Vereinigte 
Flugtechnische 
Werke (VFW) 
Olie 1996 69 The 
Netherlands 
 
Germany 
Aerospace 1969-1979 
B Hoogovens 
 
Hoesch 
Olie 1996 75 The 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Steel 1972-1982 
C Electrolux 
 
Zanussi 
Andersson 
et al. 
25 Sweden 
 
Italy 
Household 
appliances 
1984 
 
Table 1. Overview over case studies included in the qualitative part of the study. 
 
Step 1 entailed an in-depth analysis of case A and B. First, we studied the cases in a 
qualitative analysis. Thereafter, we applied the third step of the case survey method, in which 
we coded case A and B to obtain quantified measures of the cases. In the coding procedure we 
were able to identify themes that were extracted from the qualitative analysis, but not 
captured in the Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) framework. It should be noted that 
measurements already existed for case C since it was included in the study by Larsson & 
Finkelstein (1999) and therefore was part of the database. 
Step 2 was concentrated around a comparative design. Here, we first applied the fourth 
step of the case survey method where we analyzed the coded data. This, together with 
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findings in step 1, gave us an indication which themes to focus on in the qualitative 
comparison between case A, B and C. The comparison required to first make a small 
qualitative analysis of case C. On the quantitative side, we made use of our quantified 
measures from phase 1 to make a cross-sectional analysis with the database. Figure 3 provides 
an overview of the research steps. In the following sections, the different steps of the 
qualitative method will be described first, followed by the steps of the case survey method. 
 Qualitative method  Case survey method 
Step 0 Selection of cases 
 
Step 1 
 
Qualitative analysis of case A and B. 
  
Coding of case A and B. 
 
Step 2 
 
Qualitative analysis of case C. 
 
Qualitative comparison between 
case A, B and C. 
  
Quantitative analysis of code from 
phase 1. 
Cross-sectional comparison with 
database. 
 
Figure 3. Overview of steps in the method. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
A case study re-examination made it less complex to perform a qualitative data analysis 
than can be the case with primary data from interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The approach 
used for analysis can be described as a simple form of grounded theory as described by 
Bryman & Bell (2011). As we read through case A and B, concepts were noted down, defined 
as topics that were frequently described as important factors affecting the case. The concepts 
were grouped into a higher level of categories, or themes and were discussed between the 
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authors to agree upon a final set of themes. In the subsequent coding procedure, we were able 
to identify themes that were extracted from the qualitative analysis, but not captured in the 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) framework.  
Qualitative comparison between cases 
After step 1 and the quantitative analysis of the code in step 2, we had narrowed down our 
findings into key factors going into the qualitative analysis of case C in step 2. This analysis 
was carried out in a similar way to the analysis of case A and B, but our key factors guided us 
towards particular themes.  In the qualitative comparison between case A, B and C we were 
able to extract common themes where the two unsuccessful cases A and B contrasted to the 
successful case C in the area of organizational integration. 
Coding of cases 
In the first step of our study, we obtained quantified measures of case A and B via the 
coding step of the case survey method.  
Coding scheme. In order to be able compare our measurements with the cases in the 
Larsson & Finkelstein database (1999), we chose to make use of the same coding scheme. 
Rikard Larsson provided us with the coding scheme comprising of a questionnaire. Using 
questions that have been employed by other researchers provide a benefit since they have 
already been piloted and tested for validity and reliability (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The coding 
scheme had a total of 51 questions divided into sections corresponding to the variables in the 
theoretical framework (see Figure 1). The first section concerned sources of synergy and the 
potential to realize and actual realization of each source. Each section had a number of 
questions where the raters could reply on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 where 1 was very low and 
5 was very high. There was also an option where the raters could choose ‘insufficient 
information’, denoted with 9. The entire coding scheme can be found in Appendix A. We 
decided to only make use of questions 1-44 due to the fact that the last seven questions 
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required more detailed information that was unavailable in the case descriptions. We assessed 
that an attempt to code these questions would only reduce quality of data.  
Coding procedure. The case studies were coded by two of the authors (Bjurström & 
Schreil). Using two raters saves resources and reduces the risk of low reliability, but has the 
weakness of equal number of votes to resolve discrepancy. More raters could have improved 
the interpretation of data and reduced the number of mistakes (Larsson, 1993). The two 
authors coded the cases separately and on different locations so that the authors could not 
influence one another. As suggested by Larsson (1993), the raters noted sections in the case 
text that they viewed as important for the coding and kept a list of page references to the text 
on each question. After finishing the coding, the two raters discussed their scores and agreed 
on a consensus score where inputs were different. Each of the two authors argued for their 
score before a consensus score was agreed upon. The specific research question was 
formulated after finalizing the coding, which reduced the risk of potential bias towards a 
certain direction in the coding process. 
Coding quality was measured using interrater reliability. As suggested by Larsson (1993), 
this was calculated by using average pairwise percent agreement (APPA), defined as the 
number of pairwise identical codes divided by the total number of pair comparisons. The 
resulting percentage between 0 and 100 indicates how well the coding scores of the raters 
agree. If both raters have exactly the same coding, the interrater reliability is equal to 100 and 
if none of the scores are the same, the interrater reliability is equal to 0. Hence, the higher the 
interrater reliability, the higher the coding quality. Two-thirds agreement (~67%) is regarded 
as a satisfactory reliability (Larsson, 1993). In order to increase interrater reliability we 
collapsed question 5-15 concerning synergy sources into a 3-point-scale. This was done by 
translating the original coding in the 5-point-scale to a 3-point-scale via the rules in Table 2.  
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5-point-
scale score 
3-point-
scale score 
9, 1, 2 0 
3 1 
4, 5 2 
 
Table 2. Translation rules between the 5-point Likert scale and the 3-point Likert scale. 
 
The approach is described in Larsson (1993) and was also used in the original study by 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999). We achieved an interrater reliability above two thirds for both 
cases in our study (see Appendix B). 
Quantitative data analysis 
The coded cases were summarized into two tables with the respective codes and the 
consensus code (see Appendix B). These were subsequently given to our supervisor Rikard 
Larsson who helped us to enter the data into his database, which calculated scores for each 
variable in the theoretical framework. The resulting scores between 1 and 5 were interpreted 
as very low to very high. For example, a score of 5 on organizational integration was 
interpreted as the merger was successful in the integration phase. As a result, we received a 
file with our case study scores aligned with case C and the average scores of all cross-border 
and domestic mergers respectively (see Appendix C).  
Cross-sectional comparison with database 
The results from the coding enabled a cross-case comparison between our cases and other 
cases in the database. The resulting scores between 1 and 5 were interpreted as very low to 
very high. For example, a score of 5 on organizational integration was interpreted as a 
successful integration phase for that particular merger. Deviations, called “diff” between case 
A/B and C/cross-border average were calculated by subtracting the scores from one another 
(see Appendix C). These were used to find contrasting variables between the cases. 
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Reliability and validity 
The mixed method approach applied in this research study implies different levels of 
reliability and validity for different parts of the study. 
Reliability. The nature of a qualitative study makes it difficult to replicate due to 
unstructured data relying on the researchers subjective interpretation (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
However, our study has a quantitative element consisting of the case survey method. An 
obvious strength of case surveys is that they can be replicated because of the coding schemes 
and availability of the case studies to other researchers (Larsson, 1993). However, they may 
be subject to problems associated with subjective coding for all variables in a study (Larsson, 
1999). Our test for interrater reliability showed, however, that the coding quality was 
sufficient in this study. 
Internal validity is the strength of qualitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2011) due to the 
in-depth analysis of the relationship between observations and theory. The use of case studies 
implies access only to secondary data, which reduces the transparency of observations. 
However, we claim that the use of case studies increase the internal validity of this study 
since we make use of an established researcher’s interpretation of primary data.  
External validity can also be referred to as the ability to generalize our study to a broader 
context (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Overall, we claim a low degree of generalization for the 
qualitative part of our study due to the fact that we employ a case study with only three cases. 
However, the use of two unsuccessful cases and one successful case should increase the 
ability to use our findings on a broader set of M&As since we have tested our findings on 
contrasting cases. For the quantitative part of the study, we have compared our data with a 
database built on an established theoretical framework, which ensures that we have measured 
the right concepts (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
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RESULTS 
Both the Fokker-VFW and the Hoogovens-Hoesch mergers (Olie, 1996) were unsuccessful 
in the sense that the expected synergies were not realized and that they eventually were 
broken up into their original constituents. Some of the main external and internal factors 
behind these outcomes are described below. Then, a comparison with a successful cross-
border M&A, Electrolux-Zanussi (Andersson et al., 1989), is presented to see if the same 
factors were present and if so, why it was possible to achieve a completely different outcome. 
Case A: The Fokker-VFW merger 
The aerospace industry is characterized by extremely high costs for R&D and production, 
and thereby very large risks, especially in the civil segment where orders are less predictable. 
Since firm size is important in order to reduce risks and spread fixed costs over larger 
production runs, a long range of M&As within European countries has taken place following 
World War II. There were also a number of cross-border collaborations and joint ventures 
such as Airbus in the civil segment and Starfighter in the military segment. By 1969, Fokker 
was the only Dutch company in the aerospace industry. Fokker operated mainly in the civil 
segment and had a respected sales organization and relatively cost efficient production. VFW 
was created through a merger between Weserflug and Fokker-Wulf in 1963, and accounted 
for two thirds of German aircraft industry capacity. VFW’s main operations were in the 
military segment, the German state being its main customer, but VFW also developed a civil 
aircraft, the VFW 614. As a condition to provide financial aid, both the Dutch and German 
governments required Fokker and VFW, respectively, to seek partnership with other firms. 
The complementarity of Fokker’s civil and VFW’s military operations were seen as a good 
fit. They had also previously had a successful collaboration on the Starfighter project. The 
two firms merged in 1969. 
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General economic factors. The Fokker-VFW merger sustained considerable pressure due 
to a general economic recession in the 1970s and the oil crisis in 1973, which severely 
increased fuel price and thereby the operational costs of airline firms, who postponed or 
cancelled their orders of new airplanes. Another challenge for the European aerospace 
industry was its fragmentation along national lines and the lack of an integrated European 
aerospace policy and home market, especially compared to the more efficient US market. 
State involvement. A potentially important factor behind the low integration effort is that 
the decision to merge was not primarily driven by strategic or operational motives. Seeking 
permanent partnerships with other firms in the industry was a condition of the Dutch and 
German governments for continued financial support to the new and expensive development 
projects Fokker F28 and VFW614, respectively. There were also other influences from the 
state, which were harmful for the merger. Fokker-VFW attempted to balance the employment 
situation by transferring some operations from the Netherlands to Germany. However for 
employment reasons The Dutch government ordered that all work on the military F-16 project 
to be kept in the Netherlands. Most major European governments displayed similar tendencies 
of national focus. 
Managerial factors. A central management board was established for the combined firm 
with responsibility for policy making and implementation. However, this board was unable to 
exercise control of the operating companies, and give proper direction to the merger. The 
central board consisted of individuals with an external focus, with experience from high 
government or advisory board positions, but little technical or industrial management 
experience. Against seasoned managers in the national operating firms with a long industry 
careers, the board was not strong enough. There was a lack of integration leadership with both 
strength and skill to merge the different traditions and identities into a cohesive unity. 
Another sign of failed integration was a consultancy report that was established three years 
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after the merger, which established that the lack of corporate identity was a core problem. 
Indeed, the original company names were kept, and the products continued to be marketed 
with the original product names and under separate brands. There were no common projects. 
The combined company had no meaning, neither in its own organization, nor to the outside 
world. 
Union and worker participation. In 1976, the Co-Determination Act was passed in West 
Germany. By this time, the merger was already in very bad shape. But even if it had been 
more successful, the new law may have seriously restrained it. The law prescribed board 
parity between shareholders and representatives of the German workforce. Consequences 
would be that Germans would represent the Dutch work force and that with equal 
shareholding between Dutch and Germans, the board would be three quarters German. Both 
consequences were unacceptable to Fokker. Some solutions were proposed, but the merger 
was in effect already over. 
Case B: Estel - the Hoogovens-Hoesch merger 
There were two distinct trends in the steel industry in the 1960’s. The first was a shift 
towards larger units to achieve economies of scale, which was a necessity to meet the 
increased overseas competition from the US and Japan, and also due to new production 
technologies with a higher minimum efficient scale. The second was a move towards coastal 
locations. Traditionally, production sites were situated close to mining areas in order to secure 
cheap deliveries. But with high-grade iron ore and coal becoming available from new 
producers overseas, and the cost of sea transportation declining, coastal locations became a 
competitive advantage. Hoogovens was the only Dutch steel producer, and hence needed to 
find a partner from another country in order to reach a competitive size. Hoesch, being one of 
several steel firms in Germany,  needed not only to increase its production efficiency, but also 
access to a coastal location. Substantial synergies were expected through Hoogovens’ coastal 
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location and Hoesch’s close access to a main industrial region. There was a complementary fit 
between Hoogovens’ steel production and Hoesch’s downstream steel processing operations. 
An investment policy for and coordination of overlapping steel production the between the 
two firms would also render substantial savings. The two firms merged in 1972. 
General economic factors. Estel also suffered badly from severe macro-economic 
conditions. The steel crisis 1975 – 1983 put substantial strain on the integration of the original 
firms. The European steel industry suffered from loss of export markets to overseas 
competitors and experienced considerable over-capacity. 
State involvement. Steel is an industry that is strongly connected to military and economic 
national independence, and also one, which employs tens of thousands of workers, often in 
regions structured around it. Therefore, during the steel crisis, European governments heavily 
subsidized many domestic steel enterprises. This policy, which was counter to EC regulations, 
prevented a needed rationalization of the European steel industry. Less efficient firms were 
maintained, which burdened more efficient firms. Estel eventually also applied for 
government help to support a major restructuring. However, it was rejected by the German 
state since it would mean using German funds to support a bi-national company. 
Legal structure and cultural differences. Due to the absence of a European company law, 
a complex legal structure needed to be created, which maintained the operating companies in 
each country separate. A central holding company under Dutch law was established. The high 
integration intentions compared to Fokker-VFW were to be implemented through the use of 
co-ordination groups – an organizational setup different from the legal structure. However, 
this proved to be very difficult due to differences in national culture. The Germans seemed to 
attach far more importance to the legal structure and maintained loyalty only along those lines 
and to the national company. The legal construct also produced dual roles that were not 
conducive to integration. The national companies appointed representatives to the Estel 
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supervisory board, and similar role problems existed in the coordination groups. The case 
study also bears testimony of substantial cultural differences in working practices that 
originates from national traditions, such as management style, decision making processes, the 
purpose of meetings and how to relate to decisions taken. Another issue described was 
nationalistic attitudes. The companies referred to one another as the Dutch and the Germans, 
not as Hoovogens and Hoesch. 
Managerial factors. As in the Fokker-VFW merger, the integration leadership was not 
able to overcome the strong loyalties to the original national operating companies. The case 
study also indicates differences in both organizational and national culture as major obstacles 
to efficient integration. There was no experienced and charismatic integration manager that 
could bridge these differences or create a new corporate identity. 
Union and worker participation. The unions and worker representation laws played an 
important role before and during the Estel years. Spurred by fears of foreign control and 
major restructuring by the more efficient steel operations of Hoogovens, the Hoesch worker 
union in Dortmund, as well as the worker representative in the board, the “Arbeitsleiter”, 
opposed many of the initiatives to create an integrated and efficient operating company. The 
differences between German and Dutch laws of worker participation also caused problems 
when creating the legal structure. 
Comparison with a successful acquisition: Electrolux-Zanussi (case C) 
Electrolux had since the mid-1960s pursued a growth strategy based on acquisitions. It was 
by the early 1980’s a large and diversified company, and one of the world’s largest 
manufacturers of home appliances, which counted for 52 percent of the group’s sales in 1984. 
By this time, Electrolux was looking for an acquisition to expand its appliance business and 
Zanussi was considered a very good fit, for example with a large market share in washing 
machines, where Electrolux was weak. Zanussi was an Italian home appliances firm that 
  34 
 
experienced considerable growth in the 1950s and 1960s. By 1984 however, it suffered from 
heavy losses and debts after a period of unrelated and unsuccessful diversification. The 
company needed fresh capital and searched for a partner. Electrolux’s acquisition of Zanussi, 
which was formally completed in Dec 1984, was a success that exceeded the expectations of 
both Electrolux itself and outside analysts. Strategic, operational and organizational 
integration was achieved to a very high degree, and a Lit 120 billion loss in 1983 was turned 
into a Lit 60 billion profit in 1987. 
State involvement. Both the Spanish and Italian government had programs for general 
employment, restructuring and worker training purposes, but the home appliance industry as 
such is not one of particular national interest or involvement from the state. There are no 
indications of government subsidies that disturbed competition or the incentives for 
operational or business excellence. The acquisition was made purely from a business 
perspective without pressure or conditions from any national government. 
Managerial factors. With a record of over 200 acquisitions in 40 countries, Electrolux had 
tremendous experience in identifying target firms well as managing the acquisition and 
integration processes. The general practice, which was implemented also in the acquisition of 
Zanussi, was to move quickly early in the integration process. Top management was removed 
but middle management and marketing/sales staff retained. Task forces with representatives 
from both companies were created to identify synergies and key action points, to build 
relationships, and to foster management confidence, mutual understanding and enhance flow 
of information. Two Italians were brought in as chairman and managing director for Zanussi. 
The two had a long experience in industry and working with Swedish colleagues from turning 
around SKF’s Italian operations, and they were an ideal team to bridge the vastly different 
cultures and management styles. Another example of successful integration activity was team-
building activities which helped to overcome cultural distances, and that resulted in a 
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common mission statement, values and guiding principles. Counter to reports from the 
Fokker-VFW merger, managers at mid-level who would did not support the mission 
statement and combined operations were openly by-passed – a clear signal that integration 
was not an optional objective. Finally, frequent visits by top management, who displayed 
skill, excitement and enthusiasm helped build mutual respect and assurance that Zanussi was 
not just a conquest but also rather a partnership. 
Union and worker participation. The Zanussi unions were powerful, and at first opposed 
to being acquired by Electrolux. These concerns were met with assurances and commitments 
to retain important functions in Italy. There was an exchange between union leaders of 
Sweden and Italy, creating reassurance and insight to local production systems and labor 
relations. Also workforce reductions were accepted after a complete restructuring program 
based on a broad industry analysis, evaluation of Zanussi’s competitive position and a 
detailed investment plan had been presented to the union leaders. The negotiations were 
characterized by openness from the management that was unusual in Italian industrial 
relations. Further constructive agreements were made with the unions, and the management of 
Zanussi had an open and transparent approach toward the unions and gained respect from the 
union leaders and contributed to success. 
Cross-sectional analysis with database 
The coding we performed of case A and B according to coding scheme used in Larsson & 
Finkelstein (1999) enabled us to make comparisons with other cases in the database. The 
resulting variable scores of case A and B are listed in Table 3 together with the scores for case 
C, the average score of cross-border M&As and the average score of domestic M&As (see 
also Appendix C for more details). 
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Variable Case A Case B Case C Cross-
border 
average 
N=16 
Domestic 
average 
 
N=45 
Synergy realisation 1,1 1,1 3,1 2,0 1,6 
Combination 
potential 
3,0 3,0 3,7 3,3 3,0 
Organizational 
integration 
1,5 2,5 5,0 3,3 2,8 
Employee 
resistance 
3,5 3,5 2,5 2,3 2,8 
Acculturation 1,0 1,0 4,0 2,6 2,6 
Communication 1,0 2,0 5,0 3,8 2,9 
Career 
implication 
3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 2,8 
 
Table 3. Results of cross-sectional analysis. 
 
As a general observation, the synergy realization and organizational integration scores of 
cross-border combinations were better than those of domestic combinations.  
Synergy realisation was, as expected, low for case A and B. Both cases performed worse 
than cross-border average while case C performed better than cross-border average  
Combination potential was close to average for cross-border mergers for case A and B 
while case C was slightly higher than cross-border average. This indicated that both case A 
and B had potential to realize synergies from the merger combination. However, as seen 
above, this potential was not realized.  
Organizational integration scores differed a lot between case A/B and C, where case A 
and B performed lower than cross-border average and case C scored at a maximum 5.  
Employee resistance for case A and B was higher than average and case C. However, case 
C also had a slightly higher score than average. The sub-variables Acculturation and 
Communication stood out as differing the most between case A/B and C. These variables also 
differed between case A/B and the cross-border average, but not as much as compared to 
case C. 
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ANALYSIS 
Qualitative analysis 
In the re-examination of the two case studies, we identified a number of themes that 
seemed to have important consequences for the organizational integration. In the terms by 
which they will be used as proposed components of our revised theoretical framework they 
were i) state involvement ii) legal obstacles, iii) national culture, iv) integration management, 
v) union power. These themes are summarized below with respect all three cases, and how 
they relate to their different outcomes. 
State involvement. In cases A and B, state involvement was strong due to their respective 
industries being connected to national economic, technical and military independence as well 
as employment. It contributed negatively to organizational integration through the effects of 
national rather than European priority from the governments in a number of decisive 
situations. In case C state involvement was weak, and therefore had no impact on 
organizational integration. 
Legal obstacles. Apart from a number problems of more practical nature, such as different 
accounting rules or tax effects, the impossibility to create a legal structure conducive to 
integration was a major obstacle in cases A and B. It reinforced employee loyalty to the 
original companies and hindered organizational integration. A dimension of national culture 
reinforced the effect since the Germans were more attached to the legal structure than to 
organizational structure created to enhance coordination and integration. The potential 
barriers indicated by Mazzolini (1975) are supported by our findings. These legal obstacles, 
especially legal structure became important problems in cases A and B since they were both 
mergers of parity between the original firms. This is what makes the difference compared to 
case C, which was a pure acquisition. The acquiring company had direct legal power and 
ability to create an organization that reinforced the desired level of organizational integration.  
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National culture. Although differences organizational culture can be a challenge also in 
domestic M&As, national culture adds another dimension to cross-border M&As (Olie, 
1996). National traditions and culture influence the way people behave and interact, for 
example in management styles (Hofstede, 1984) and decision making processes, and it caused 
much frustration in cases A and B. The framework for measuring cultural distance by 
Hofstede (1984) explains the cultural differences between Germany and The Netherlands. 
Germany has stronger uncertainty avoidance, with a much higher need for formalization, 
which was causing challenges in the integration process in both case A and B. According to 
Hofstede (1984), the differences in need for formalization may lead to deep 
misunderstandings and inefficiencies when management skills are transferred between 
countries. Although management style similarity is included in the model of Larsson & 
Finkelstein (1999) and culture is included as a sub-variable to employee resistance (Larsson et 
al., 2004), the three cases provides support to include a measure of national cultural distance 
as proposed by Hofstede (1984). Also in case C, there were significant cultural differences, 
but these were managed in a much more successful way. 
Integration management. The comparison between case A and B on one hand, and C on 
the other illustrates the diametric difference a strong and experienced integration management 
team can have. In case A and B, an indecisive leadership with little influence over the national 
companies, and seemingly little understanding of the importance of, and challenges to achieve 
corporate unity.  In case C the acquiring company had a long experience of acquisitions and 
the integration was well prepared already before the deal was closed. The previous board was 
replaced with a team that had long experience in industrial management and an ideal 
background to understand and bridge cultural differences. They also managed union 
opposition in a very constructive way. This finding is consistent with the findings of Dikova 
& Sahib (2013), who concluded that cross-border acquisition performance is dependent on the 
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level of acquisition experience of the acquirer: experienced cross-border acquirers are more 
likely to be aware of cultural differences. Teerikangas et al., (2011) highlights the role of the 
integration manager as a change agent and cultural carrier. 
Union power. In all three cases, worker unions were significant players in the integration 
game, and their strength and ability to influence or even reject decisions by top management 
should be taken into account. A model component should include union strength in terms of 
size, organization and tradition, as well as legislation of worker representation and co-
determination. The union opposition in cases A and B, well organized and also supported by 
national legislation, was difficult to manage, especially in the steel industry. Less detail is 
known about union opposition in case C, except that it was initially strong, but successfully 
managed by the acquiring firm. 
Quantitative cross-sectional analysis 
In our quantitative cross-sectional analysis we found contrasting scores in the different 
cases that supported the findings related to culture and integration management in the 
qualitative analysis. 
Cross border average vs. domestic average. The first interesting observation was the 
differences between the synergy realization and organizational integration scores of cross-
border M&As and domestic M&As. In spite of the various challenges involved with cross-
border M&As found in the literature (e.g. Larsson et al., 2004; Mazzolini, 1975, Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988), the average scores of the sub-set of cross-border M&As in the database 
were in general higher than those of the domestic M&As. This might imply that management 
in cross-border M&As are more prepared for the challenges associated with the different 
nationalities of the companies. Organizational integration and communication are the two 
variables that are differing mostly between cross-border and domestic M&As, which indicates 
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that these two variables might explain why cross-border M&As are generally more successful 
than domestic M&As.  
High potential in cases A and B, but low synergy realization. Even though the scores for 
case A and B on the variable combination potential were almost as high as case C and the 
cross-border average, the outcome of the mergers were still unsuccessful. The question is 
why. Our cross-sectional analysis showed that organizational integration stood out as a 
variable that differed greatly between the unsuccessful cases A/B and the successful case C. 
As seen in the theory, organizational integration plays an important role in synergy realization 
and has a direct effect on M&A performance (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). The low scores 
on organizational integration for case A and B could therefore be one of the key factors 
behind the unsuccessful outcome of the mergers, which supports the relevance of our research 
question.  
Employee resistance. High employee resistance for case A and B can be explained by the 
two sub-variables acculturation and communication, which stood out as differing a lot 
between the cases. As we have seen in the literature, acculturation is the process of 
overcoming cultural barriers by performing certain activities as part of the integration process 
(Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). We have also seen that the integration manager has an important 
role in this process, by functioning as a cultural carrier (Teerikangas et al., 2011). 
Communication to employees during the integration process seems to be of great importance 
to cross-border M&As according to the database. Not only is this variable a contrasting factor 
between success and failure, it is also higher for cross-border average than for domestic 
average. We claim that communication is also related to the integration manager in his role as 
change agent and knowledge transferor. The literature partly supports this by describing the 
integration manager as a person who should help to spur change, provide a link to top 
management and connect people (Teerikangas et al., 2011). 
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Interestingly, case C, our successful case, scored higher than the cross-border average to 
the largest extent on organizational integration, acculturation and communication. This is yet 
another indication that these three variables play an important role in the success of cross-
border M&As. 
Revised theoretical framework 
Based on the empirical findings and the analysis above we think that the preliminary 
theoretical framework for cross-border M&As could benefit from being updated as illustrated 
in Figure 4.
 
Figure 4. Revised theoretical framework. 
 
In the original framework for M&A in general, the cross-border variable is present as a yes 
or no variable. In a framework specifically for cross-borders M&As, it should either be 
replaced with the new variables state involvement, legal obstacles and national culture, or 
transformed into a continuous variable composed of a weighted sum of these three as sub-
components. We have found integration management as a very important factor in the three 
cases analyzed. But since the effectiveness of integration management is not unique to cross-
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border M&As it should be included as a separate variable not connected to the cross-border 
variable(s). Integration management acts in three ways: Directly and independently on 
organizational integration through a number of ways to forge the unified post-merger firm; by 
moderating the effects of differences in national culture and management styles; and by 
moderating employee resistance, both through ensuring constructive communication and 
acculturation (Larsson et al., 2004), and through effectively managing union opposition. 
Finally, union power is also suggested separately from the cross-border variable(s) to indicate 
that it may be relevant also for domestic mergers. If to a lesser extent, it will simply have a 
lower value. We see union power as an organization of, or extension of employee resistance, 
and it can be included as a sub-component of this variable. 
CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
In this study, we have found four factors influencing organizational integration in cross-
border M&As: (i) state involvement (ii) legal obstacles, (iii) national culture and (iv) 
integration management. In addition, we have identified one factor that we believe influences 
employee resistance: union power. We have suggested how these five factors can be included 
in an integrated model of synergy realization by sketching a revised theoretical framework 
that can be regarded as an extension of the Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) model relevant for 
cross-border M&As.  
We have found support for the importance of national culture, legal obstacles and 
integration management in cross-border M&As both in the literature (Dikova & Sahib, 2013; 
Hofstede, 1984; Mazzolini, 1975; Terrikangas et al., 2011) and in the qualitative as well as 
the quantitative analysis. For this reason, we claim that these findings rest on solid ground. It 
is our recommendation though, that these factors should be quantitatively tested in a modified 
coding scheme in a case survey study on a larger sample of cases. The variables state 
involvement and union strength emerged from the qualitative analysis and requires further 
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qualitative investigations with a larger sample of cases; unsuccessful as well as successful 
cross-border M&As. Should this investigation support our findings, we recommend a similar 
quantitative approach as mentioned above to test these findings. 
Our comparison between the average scores of domestic and cross-border M&As in the 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) database showed that cross-border M&As had a higher 
organizational integration on average than domestic M&As. This finding might seem contrary 
to our research purpose, where we anticipate that there are barriers to organizational 
integration in cross-border M&As. However, it should be noted that the sample of cross-
border M&As in the database is only 16, and there is a possibility that the sample is biased 
towards successful M&As. Another explanation, as noted in the analysis, might be that the 
managers in cross-border M&As are more culturally aware and prepared for cultural conflicts 
(Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). This only supports our findings that the integration manager 
plays an important role in cross-border M&As. 
This study has some limitations worth noting. First of all, we have used secondary data 
from case studies in our analysis. This carries a risk of missing out on important primary data 
and we have not had the chance to get back to the source to ask follow-up questions, which 
could have helped us in confirming our findings. Furthermore, the author of case A and B is 
of Dutch nationality, which induces a risk of subjectivity in the description of challenges in 
the cases, especially those out of cultural nature. A second limitation in the selection of cases 
is the number of cases studied. We have only studied two unsuccessful cases and one 
successful case. A larger sample, at least one more successful case, could have contributed to 
a higher validity of our findings. However, we believe that a major benefit of using existing 
case studies for secondary analysis was that we could avoid the tedious work of interpreting 
and structuring primary data, by re-using work from an established researcher, who probably 
has more developed data interpretation skills than students. If we had chosen to collect 
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primary data ourselves, we probably could only have studied one or maximum two cases due 
to resource limitations. Studying cross-border M&As would probably also have implied 
travelling between countries. For the above reasons, we believe that the use of case studies 
only presented us with a larger opportunity to make a cross-sectional case study with higher 
validity of the findings. 
A third and final limitation related to our empirical data is the age of the cases. Case A and 
B took place in the 1970’s, while case C took place in the 1980’s. One could question how 
this affects the relevance of our findings for today and the future. In spite of the age of our 
cases, we find support for our findings also in recent literature such as Teerikangas et al., 
(2011) and Dikova & Sahib (2013), which supports the relevance of our conclusions. The 
variable legal obstacles might be less of a barrier in Europe today, since EU has become much 
stronger and new legislations have been passed (Siems, 2005). However, in cross-border 
M&As between countries who are not part of EU, this is still a relevant barrier. 
Finally, we believe that our contribution to M&A research is two-fold: (1) we have pointed 
at important factors for organizational integration in cross-border M&As and (2) attempted to 
include them in an integrated framework. We have done this with an acceptable level of 
reliability and validity with a relevant sample of cases and suggested ways of testing our 
findings in future research. 
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APPENDIX A – CODING SCHEME 
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Decision Dynamics 
M&A Performance Case Survey 
 
 
This questionnaire is designed to measure the strategic, organizational, human resource, and 
management potentials and performance of mergers, acquisitions (M&A), and alliances. It 
can be answered based on (i) personal observations of involved practitioners and/or (ii) 
through interviews with involved practitioners.  
 
Please answer all the following 51 questions. Then return the whole questionnaire. 
 
1. a) Your “focal” merger, acquisition or alliance:___________________________________ 
 
    b) This combination started in: _____________ and observation ended in:______________ 
 
    c) Your name:____________________________   & position:_______________________ 
 
    d) Your past experience with how many other mergers & acquisitions:____ & alliances___ 
 
  
2. Estimate relative size defined as: 1 - 1.0 < x < 1.5 
         annual sales of bigger firm 2 - 1.5  < x < 3.0 
         annual sales of smaller firm 3 - 3.0  < x < 6.0 
 of the year of or prior to the legal combination 4 - 6.0 < x < 10.0 
 (if sales not available use total assets, if also  5 - 10.0 < x 
 not available use total number of employees). 9 - Insufficient info  
 
3. Estimate the production relationship between 1 - Unrelated (ie. neither long linked, nor 
the joining firms. Their closest related* major   similar, nor identical as defined 
 production is mainly   below). 
    2 - Long-linked (ie. the output of one firm 
 *(If one or more firms have more than one   correspond to the input of the other). 
 major production, choose the closest related 3 - Similar (ie. one or two of the categories 
 combination where closeness is defined by   input/suppliers, process, and output 
 the numerical order of the given positions).   are similar 
    4 - Identical (ie. same input and same 
      process and same output).  
    9 - Insufficient info 
 
4. Please write the main industry type of: c) How similar are the firms’ industry types? 
 
 a) the acquiring firm: __________ 1 - Very different 
   2 - 
 b) the acquired firm: __________ 3 - Moderately similar 
   4 -  
   5 - Very similar 
    9 - Insufficient info  
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S y n e r g y 
Synergy is a difficult concept to measure. This is solved by breaking it down into 10 sources 
(with an optional extra source to cover possible not enumerated sources) that will be coded for 
both their potential and their actual realization. 
 
Synergy potential is defined as the potential benefits (here in terms of reduced cost per unit, 
enabled price increases, joint sales increases, and learned know-how) from interaction 
between the joining firms given optimal integration of them. Observe that the synergy 
potential variables refer to the actual potential and not false beliefs that later turn out to be 
surprising underestimations or overestimations impossible to realize no matter how good 
integration. 
 
Synergy realization is defined as the actual benefits (reduced cost per unit, etc) created by the 
interaction between the joining firms. Observe that the synergy realization variables are not 
estimations of how many % synergy potentials that were realized – full realization (ie. 100%) 
of a low amount of synergy potential is still considered as low (amount of) synergy 
realization. The total amount of synergy realization can be inferred from improvements of the 
joint performance that is not explained by other factors than the interaction between the 
joining firms (strong overall growth of the economy would be one such “other factor”). Thus, 
maintained performance in a situation of deteriorating market conditions and industry decline 
can indicate significant synergy realization if it is not explained by still other factors. 
Furthermore, very low synergy potential can be used to infer very low synergy realization 
(like if it is obvious that there was no synergy to be realized).  
 
The probably most important indications of synergy potentials and realization is when the 
same amount of work could be, respectively was done jointly by less number of employees 
compared with separately before the combination.  
The magnitude of potential and realized benefits in  
terms of positive changes in costs per unit,  Very low = around 0 % 
prices, and joint sales can be distinguished  Low = around + 1 % 
according to the list to the right. It is only a Medium = around + 2 % 
loose guideline to give an idea of different High = around + 3 % 
magnitudes, since these percentages are  Very high = around + 4 % 
seldom given.   
 
Synergy source: Estimate potential Estimate realized 
 amount of benefits: amount of benefits: 
 
Consolidated purchase of 5a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
input in order to reduce  2 -     2 - 
purchase price/cost per  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
unit (like through volume  4 -     4 - 
rebates).  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
 
Consolidated production in 6a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
in order to reduce production  2 -     2 - 
cost per unit (like utili-  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
zation of excess capacity)  4 -     4 - 
  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
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Synergy source: Estimate potential Estimate realized 
 amount of benefits: amount of benefits: 
 
Consolidated marketing in 7a. 1 - Very low b. 1 - Very low 
order to reduce marketing  2 -   2 - 
cost per unit (like integrated  3 - Medium  3 - Medium 
sales force with fewer  4 -   4 - 
employees).  5 - Very high  5 - Very high 
  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
 
Consolidation competitor in 8a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
in order to increase market  2 -     2 - 
power by reducing competi-  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
tion and thereby being able  4 -     4 - 
to command higher prices  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
(without losing correspon-  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
ding volume) 
 
Consolidated administration 9a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
(incl. Finance) in order to  2 -     2 - 
reduce adm. overhead per  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
unit (like elimination of  4 -     4 - 
duplicated head-offices).  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
 
Consolidation of possible 10a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
supplier or customer in  2 -     2 - 
order to reduce transaction  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
cost per unit (like  4 -     4 - 
elimination of intermediate  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
storage, marketing, and  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
purchasing). 
 
Access to new geographic 11a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
market(s) through the other  2 -     2 - 
firm’s established local  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
sales organization in order  4 -     4 - 
to increase joint sales.  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
 
Cross-selling of complemen- 12a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
tary products to joint cust-  2 -     2 - 
omers in order to increase  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
joint sales.  4 -     4 - 
  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
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Synergy source: Estimate potential Estimate realized 
 amount of benefits: amount of benefits: 
 
Transfer of existing know- 13a. 1 - Very low b. 1 - Very low 
how to one firm from the  2 -   2 - 
other(s) in order for the first  3 - Medium  3 - Medium 
firm to manage its operations  4 -   4 - 
more effectively. If more  5 - Very high  5 - Very high 
than one firm learn useful  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
know-how from the other(s) 
code the firm that learn the most and adjust its code one position (numerically) higher if the 
other firm(s) also learn significantly (around medium or more). 
*(like resulting in a major change in how operations are performed) 
 
Creation of new know-how 14a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
from the interaction between  2 -     2 - 
the joining firms that one  3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
firm can use in order to  4 -     4 - 
manage its operations more  5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
effectively. If more than one  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
firm could/did learn new useful know-how, code according previous source’s instruction. 
 
Other substantial source of 15a. 1 - Very low  b. 1 - Very low 
synergy between the joining  2 -     2 – 
firms that is of significance to   3 - Medium   3 - Medium 
the estimation of the total   4 -     4 – 
amount of synergy potential   5 - Very high   5 - Very high 
and realization of the  9 - Insufficient info  9 - Insufficient info 
combination. 
 
16. Estimate the similarity of production 1 - Very low (like different inputs, processes & 
 operations between the joining 2 -  products) 
firms based primarily on their 3 - Moderate (like some same inputs, proc. a/or prod.) 
 input, process, and product types. 4 -  
  5 - Very high (like same inputs, processes & products) 
 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
 
17. Estimate the complementarity of product- 1 - Very low (like very little output of one  
ion operations between the joining firms in 2 -  could become the input of the other) 
terms of the extent to which their different 3 - Moderate (like some output could become 
production capabilities fit each other and 4 -  input) 
can thereby be transferred between them, 5 - Very high (like much output could become 
eg vertical economies between firms   input) 
with long-linked technologies 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
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18. Estimate the similarity of marketing 1 - Very low (like different markets, cust.  
operations between the joining  2 -  groups & prod.) 
firms based primarily on their 3 - Moderate (like either same markets or  
geographic markets, customer 4 -   cust. & prods) 
groups, and main products. 5 - Very high (like same markets, cust.groups & prod.) 
 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
 
19. Estimate the complementarity of marketing 1 - very low (like very little potential cross- and 
operations between the joining firms in 2 -   new market access) selling 
terms the extent to which their different 3 - moderate (like some potential cross-sell 
marketing capabilities fit each other and 4 -  & new access) 
 can thereby be transferred between the 5 - very high (like much potential cross-sell 
 different markets and products of the two   & new access) 
 firms. 9 - insufficient information for coding 
 
20. Estimate amount of operational interaction  1 -  Very low relative to total activity 
 between the joining firms during the  2 -  in acquired firm. 
 integration period in relation to the total  3 -  Medium relative to total activity 
 amount of activity in the acquired firm (like  4 -  in acquired firm. 
 the creation of everyday material- (in services  5 -  Very high relative to total activity 
 also information-), and cash-flows between     in acquired firm. 
 the firms and/or restructuring resulting in  9 -  Insufficient info 
more permanent transfers of products, 
 facilities, personnel and other resources between the firms). 
 
21. Estimate amount of coordinative effort 1 - Very low (like few mechanisms little used) 
 expended to enhance synergy 2 -  . 
 realization by adjusting the operational 3 - Medium (like few mech - much used, some 
 interaction between the joining firms. 4 -  mech - some used, many mech - little used) 
 This can be interfered from the amount 5 - Very high relative to total activity 
 of utilization of coordination   in acquired firm. 
 mechanisms across the joining like 9 - Insufficient info 
 special integrators, transition teams,   
 management info systems, integration plans, senior management involvement, 
 
“T h e   H u m a n   S i d e” 
Employee resistance is a key variable of “the human side” of M&A. It is here defined as the 
active and passive opposition by (primarily acquired) employees against the combination and 
integration processes with the other (acquiring) firm. Examples of employee resistance are 
vocal opposition (voice), symbolic opposition (like anti-acquirer posters), voluntary exits, 
absenteeism, passivity, and sabotage. 
 
22. Estimate average acquired 1 - Very low (like almost no opposition by 
 employee resistance against 2 -  most employees). 
 the integration  process with the 3 - Medium (like some opposition by 
 acquiring firm during the first 4 -  most employees). 
 half of the studied integration 5 - Very high (like very strong opposition by 
 period.   most employees). 
  9 - Insufficient info 
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23. Estimate average acquired 1 - Very low (like almost no opposition by 
 employee resistance against 2 -  most employees). 
 the continued integration 3 - Medium (like some opposition by 
 process with the acquiring 4 -  most employees). 
 firm during the second half 5 - Very high (like very strong opposition by 
 of the studied integration   most employees). 
 period. 9 - Insufficient info 
 
24. Estimate level of achieved 1 - Very low (like continued strong cultural clash 
 acculturation (defined as 2 -  and almost no merged joint org cult). 
 the development of jointly 3 - Medium (like some cont cult clash & some 
 shared meanings fostering 4 -  emerged joint org cult). 
 cooperation between the joining 5 - Very high (like an emerged strong joint org 
 firms) towards the end of the   cult & almost no remaining cult clash). 
 studied integration period. The 9 - Insufficient info 
 more remaining cultural clash 
between the firms (like we-they polarization and remaining or even strengthened old company 
spirit), the less acculturation has been achieved. 
 
25. Estimate degree of managerial style 1 - Very low (like no similar characteristics). 
 similarity between the joining firms 2 - 
 at the beginning of the integration 3 - Medium (around half of dim having 
 phase. Managerial style is here 4 -  similar degree). 
 viewed in terms of degrees (high vs. 5 - Very high (around all of dim having 
 low) of formality, employee parti-   cult & almost no remaining cult clash). 
 cipation, and any other dimensions 9 - Insufficient info 
 emphasized by the employees. 
 
26. Estimate degree of true communication 1 - Very low (like almost no true info to 
by the acquiring firm to the average 2 -  acquired employees). 
acquired employees about the integration 3 - Medium (like some true info to 
during the studied integration period, 4 -  acquired employees). 
like revealing integration plans before- 5 - Very high (like almost completely rich 
hand and no broken promises (ie. no   & true communication). 
withholding or giving false information).  9 - Insufficient info 
 
27. Estimate overall career implications for average acquired employees in terms of positive or 
negative effects on their future work lives from the combination and subsequent integration. 
1 - Very negative (like almost only strongly unfavorable consequences for most employees’ 
2 -  continued work situations). 
3 - Ambivalent (like a balanced mix of pos & neg or no consequences for most employees’ 
4 -  continued work lives). 
5 - Very positive (like almost only strongly favorable consequences for most employees’ 
   continued work lives after the combination). 
9 - Insufficient info 
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28. Estimate change in amount of work 1 - Strong decrease. 
that average acquired employees were 2 - 
required to contribute to the joint firm 3 - About the same as before. 
during the studied integration period 4 - 
compared with before the combination. 5 - Strong increase.  
    9 - Insufficient info 
 
29. Estimate change in rewards (both 1 - Strong decrease (like pay cuts, loss of employee 
extrinsic from pay & benefits and 2 -  benefits, and disrupted or less interesting work. 
intrinsic from the work itself) for the 3 - About the same as before (like no or 
average acquired employees during 4 -  canceled out changes). 
the studied integration period com- 5 - Strong increase (like pay raises, improved 
pared with before the combination.   benefits and more interesting work). 
 (Pay can be weighted the most and 9 - Insufficient info 
 intrinsic work the least unless case suggest otherwise.) 
 
30. Estimate change in 1 - Strong decrease (like actual or threatening lay offs, 
job security for average 2 -  shutdowns or sell offs). 
acquired employees due 3 - About the same as before (like + & - or 0). 
to the combination. 4 - 
  5 - Strong increase (like rescue from previously threatening 
    lay offs, increased profitability, and expansion). 
 9 - Insufficient info 
 
31. Estimate change in advancement opportunities for average acquired employees due to the 
combination. 
1 - Strong decrease (like merging 2 hierarchies into one resulting in mostly relative 
2 -  demotions). 
3 - About the same as before (like balanced + & - or little change). 
4 - 
5 - Strong increase (like rescue from a declining situation and access to possible  
   advancement in larger firm). 
9 - Insufficient info 
 
32. Estimate change in percentage 1 - Strong decrease (to around less than a third of 
annual overall employee turnover 2 -  prior %). 
for the acquired employees during 3 - About the same as before (around less than a 
the studied integration period 4 -  quarter + or - change). 
compared with before the 5 - Strong increase (around more than tripled). 
combination. 9 - Insufficient info  
 
33. Estimate the acquiring firm’s intermediate evaluation of the acquisition at around half of the 
studied integration period in terms of its satisfaction with the combination and subsequent 
integration up to that (half) point in time. 
1 - Very dissatisfied (like failing to fulfill even the minimal expectations). 
2 - 
3 - Ambivalent (like indifferent or balanced mix of satisfactions). 
4 - 
5 - Very satisfied (like exceeding even the most optimistic expectations).  
9 - Insufficient info 
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34. Estimate the actually sold off share  1 - Very low (around < 10%). 
of the acquired firm during the studied 2 - 
integration period.  3 - Medium (around 25 – 45%). 
   4 - 
   5 - Very high (around > 75%) 
   9 - Insufficient info 
 
35. Estimate the speed of the inte- 1 - Very slow (eg, long waiting, small steps, major delays) 
gration process, as indicated by 2 - 
how fast the intended degree of 3 - Moderate (eg, partly fast, some delays) 
operative integration and change 4 - 
were achieved after the legal 5 - Very fast (eg, immediate major steps, very few delays) 
combination. 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
 
36. To what extent was a long-term 1 - Very little (eg, almost only short-term actions) 
orientation emphasized during the 2 - 
integration process, as indicated by 3 - Moderate (eg, some long-term considerations) 
long-range planning, deliberate 4 - 
long-lasting solutions, sustainable  5 - Very much (eg, strong long-term focus) 
joint value creation, etc? 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
 
37. To what extent were 1 - Very little (eg, kept completely separate from one another) 
the joining sales  2 - 
forces integrated 3 - Moderate (eg, some combinations of sales people) 
during the studied 4 - 
integration period? 5 - Very much (eg, complete consolidation into one sales organi. 
 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
  
38. To what extent had the 1 - Very little (eg, almost all kept selling known products) 
average sales people  2 - 
to learn and sell for  3 - Moderate (eg, some had to learn and sell some new products) 
them new products 4 - 
during the first half 5 - Very much (eg, many had to learn and sell mostly new products) 
of the stud.int.period? 9 - Insufficient information for coding 
  
39. To what extent were the brand(s), a) first half of the studied integr.period b) last half of stud.p 
products, and sales people of the 1 - Very little (eg, almost none k.) 1 - Very little  
acquirer/largest firm retained 2 -  2 - 
in the joint firm during the  3 - Moderate (eg, some kept)   3 - Moderate 
(a) first and (b) last halves of the 4 -  4 - 
studied integration period? 5 - Very much (eg, almost all kept) 5 - Very much 
 9 - Insufficient info. 9 - Insuff.info. 
 
40. To what extent were the brand(s), a) first half of the studied integr.period b) last half of stud.p 
products, and sales people of the 1 - Very little (eg, almost none k.) 1 - Very little 
acquired/smallest firm retained 2 -  2 -  
in the joint firm during the  3 - Moderate (eg, some kept)   3 - Moderate 
(a) first and (b) last halves of the 4 -  4 - 
studied integration period? 5 - Very much (eg, almost all kept) 5 - Very much 
 9 - Insufficient info. 9 - insuff.info. 
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41. To what extent were new joint a) first half of the studied integr.period b) last half of stud.p 
brand(s) & products created and 1 - Very little (eg, almost no new) 1 - Very little 
new sales people hired that were 2 -  2 - 
different from either of the joining 3 - Moderate (eg, some new) 3 - Moderate 
firms during the (a) first and 4 -  4 - 
(b) last halves of the studied 5 - Very much (eg, almost all new) 5 - Very much 
integration period? 9 - Insufficient info. 9 - Insuff.info. 
 
42. How did the customers react to a) time of legal b) middle c) end of studied 
the combination in terms of combination of stud.per. integration period 
uncertainty, threats vs opportu- 1 - Very negative 1 - 1 - Very neg. 
nities, and satisfaction during the 2 -  2 - 2 - 
(a) time of legal combination, 3 - Ambivalent 3 - 3 - Ambivalent 
(b) middle, and (c) end of the 4 -  4 - 4 - 
studied integration period? 5 - Very positive 5 - 5 - Very pos. 
 9 - Insufficient info. 9 - 9 - Insuff.info. 
 
43. How was the sales performance a) middle of the studied integr.period b) end of stud.per. 
of the joint firm affected by the 1 - Strong decrease   1 - Strong decr. 
combination around the (a) middle  2 -  2 - 
(relative to the sum of the separate 3 - About the same as before   3 - About same 
sales before comb) and (b) end 4 -  4 - 
(relative to the joint sales of the 5 - Strong increase    5 - Strong incre 
first half) of the studied int.period? 9 - Insufficient info. 9 - Insuff.info. 
 
44. How was the financial performance a) middle of the studied integr.period b) end of stud.per. 
of the joint firm affected by the 1 - Strong decrease in profits 1 - Strong decr. 
combination around the (a) middle  2 -  2 - 
(relative to the sum of the separate 3 - About the same as before   3 - About same 
profits before comb) and (b) end 4 -  4 - 
(relative to the joint profit of the 5 - Strong increase in profits 5 - Strong incre 
first half) of the studied int.period? 9 - Insufficient info. 9 - Insuff.info. 
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APPENDIX B – CODING OF CASE A & B 
 
1 a Fokker&VFW
b 1969&1980
c Anders,3Eva Students
d 69% 72%
Question Anders Eva Consensus Anders Eva Consensus 59point partly=39point
2 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
3 4 3 4 2 1 2 0 0
4 5 5 5 2 2 2 1 1
5 a 3 5 4 1 2 2 0 0
b 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
6 a 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 1
b 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
7 a 4 5 4 2 2 2 0 1
b 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
8 a 3 4 4 1 2 2 0 0
b 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
9 a 2 4 3 0 2 1 0 0
b 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1
10 a 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
b 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
11 a 3 5 4 1 2 2 0 0
b 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 0
12 a 3 4 3 1 2 1 0 0
b 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
13 a 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
14 a 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
b 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
15 a 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
b 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
16 4 5 4 4 5 4 0 0
17 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
18 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
19 4 5 4 4 5 4 0 0
20 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 0
21 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0
22 3 4 3 3 4 3 0 0
23 4 5 4 4 5 4 0 0
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
28 3 2 2 3 2 2 0 0
29 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
30 3 2 3 3 2 3 0 0
31 3 4 3 3 4 3 0 0
32 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
36 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
37 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1
38 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
39 a 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
b 5 3 4 5 3 4 0 0
40 a 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
b 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
41 a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
42 a 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
b 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
C 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
43 a 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
b 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
44 a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Coding=59point=scale Coding=partly=39point=scale IRR
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1 a Hoogovens)Hoesch
b 1972)1982
c Anders,6Eva Students
d 69% 75%
Question Anders Eva Consensus Anders Eva Consensus 56point partly:36point
2 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 1
5 a 3 4 3 1 2 1 0 0
b 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
6 a 4 5 5 2 2 2 0 1
b 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1
7 a 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 1
b 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
8 a 3 4 3 1 2 1 0 0
b 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
9 a 3 4 3 1 2 1 0 0
b 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 0
10 a 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
b 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
11 a 4 5 4 2 2 2 0 1
b 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
12 a 4 5 4 2 2 2 0 1
b 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
13 a 3 4 3 1 2 1 0 0
b 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
14 a 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
b 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
15 a 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
b 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1
16 3 4 3 3 4 3 0 0
17 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
18 2 3 2 2 3 2 0 0
19 3 4 4 3 4 4 0 0
20 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 0
21 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
22 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
23 4 5 4 4 5 4 0 0
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 0
26 2 9 2 2 9 2 0 0
27 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
28 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
29 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
30 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
31 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
32 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
33 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
35 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0
36 9 3 3 9 3 3 0 0
37 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
38 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0
39 a 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
b 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
40 a 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
b 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1
41 a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
42 a 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
b 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
C 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
43 a 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
b 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1
44 a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Coding:56point:scale Coding:partly:36point:scale IRR
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APPENDIX C – DATABASE CODES AND COMPARISONS 
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